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ABSTRACT

The four articles in this journal explore various aspects of empathy and its application to oral interpretation of literature. The first article examines the concept of empathy, discusses measures of it, and includes an "accurate empathy exercise" and an empathy scale. The second article discusses the way in which the writings of Dylan Thomas reflect an empathic attitude toward people and nature and also illustrate empathy in poetic technique. The third article shows how interpreters of literature can empathize not only with emotional material in the world of the literary work, but also with the physical feel of the work's language; it then demonstrates how this method might be applied to Shakespeare's Sonnet 65. The final article adapts a psychoanalytic empathic technique for use in the oral interpretation of Keats' "Ode to Melancholy." (GW)

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The *North Carolina Journal of Speech and Drama*, a quarterly publication, accepts scholarly and research articles concerned with all phases of human communication. The *Journal* publishes articles dealing with the study of human communication as Art and Science. Although special interest may be paid to manuscripts treating North Carolina topics, studies in all areas of human communication will receive equal consideration. The *Journal* particularly welcomes essays directed to the high school or junior college speech communication or theatre instructor, and studies in all areas of speech and theatre pedogogy.

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STATEMENT OF ORIGIN

These articles were presented at the April, 1977 convention of the Southern Speech Communication Association in Knoxville, Tennessee. The Program Chairperson was Gilda Parrella of Loyola University of Chicago, Illinois. The papers represent on-going research of the four authors. Due to time limitations and the nature of the event, only portions of that research were presented. The revised texts and bibliographies are here presented in their entirety.

Alan S. DeWolfe

The Many Faces and Facets of Empathy

Empathy strikes me as a beautiful humanistic concept. In clinical psychology its positive, growth-oriented point of view is a refreshing change from the generally negative focus on disturbance and sickness. As a person, I resonate strongly and long with the idea of empathy. Empathy is tinged with *gemutlichkeit* and openness and is associated with wonderful characteristics like understanding, creativity, and altruism. It gives one a warm, rosy, glowing feeling inside just to contemplate empathy.

Following the warm glow experience, though, any attempt to get a clearer picture of exactly what empathy is can be frustrating. The scientist and researcher find empathy a pretty slippery concept. In the context of the demands of science for objectivity and clarity of definition, empathy, as it is usually used, seems amorphous and hard to differentiate from some of the other humanistic concepts. The major problems of defining and measuring empathy are far from solved.

In an attempt to clarify the concept empirically, I sampled a variety of books in psychology. In addition to the variety of definitions, I was impressed by the frequency with which empathy appears in the appendices (40%) and the fact that it appears more frequently in more recent books. Empathy appears most frequently in abnormal psychology books related to psychotherapy and in developmental psychology books as a part of the process of moral development. Some definitions of empathy follow. Donelson says, "Empathy is nonverbal communication[1]"; Marx defines empathy as "sympathetic feeling[2]"; Coleman and Page both define it as "the ability to understand and to some extent share the feelings of another person[3]"; Kleinmuntz views empathy as "the ability to attune oneself to the feelings and problems of another person[4]"; Baron, Byrne, and Kantowitz call empathy "sharing another's feelings and concerns as personally comprehensible emotions[5]"; while for McCandless and Evans empathy is "feeling with someone else."[6] My empirical approach of gathering verbal definitions found a wide divergence in meanings, which was a good indication of the breadth of meaning in the concept of empathy, but did not improve the clarity of its definition very much.

Next, I sought help by looking at how the concept of empathy is used in some of the major areas within psychology including creativity, interpersonal perception, psychotherapy, moral development, and finally, empathy as a personality characteristic of interest in its own right.

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Empathy is nestled in among traits like dominance and humor as characteristic of creative people. Greenacre suggests that high empathy in the creative individual seems to depend on the person's sensory responsiveness to his or her own body states, as well as to external objects.[7] This high level of empathy is strongly related to empathic animation of inanimate objects and anthropomorphizing animals. This kind of empathy would be very valuable to poets and to authors or playwrights in the development of character. This analysis is heavily weighted toward "projective" empathy or "putting oneself into things," rather than "adoptive" empathy or attuning oneself to another person.[8] Although both types are called empathy, they are opposites on a couple of dimensions. As indicated above, one is putting yourself into something and the other is taking on the characteristics of another person. Developmentally they are opposite, too. Projective empathy is characteristic of young children and usually lost at an early age, while adoptive empathy tends to bloom later (e.g., in adolescence), if at all. The two types of empathy are not noted for occurring together. Creative artists are often high in anthropomorphizing of objects and animals, but are not usually noted for their ability or willingness to attune themselves to the feelings of others. Psychotherapists who are strong in sharing their clients' emotions are not renowned for projecting feelings into rocks and trees.

My preference is to use the term empathy only for the "adoptive" type. It is hard for me to differentiate "projective" empathy directed toward people from the social psychologist's concept of assimilative projection. When people are asked to ascribe characteristics to others and really have no basis of judgement (e.g., to pictures of others), they often see their own characteristics in the others, and this defines assimilative projection. Projecting oneself into inanimate objects or anthropomorphizing our pets seems to me to fit the broad definition of ascribing our own characteristics when no real basis of judgement is available.

The social-psychological topic of interpersonal or person perception from which assimilative projection arose is another of the areas of psychology in which empathy is widely used. Cline discussed the issues and problems associated with gauging the accuracy of a person's ability to judge how much someone has of a trait.[9] Social psychologists define true empathy as the true accuracy which results from assessment of the trait based on direct observation of the other person. One could rate prison inmates as low in honesty without even seeing them and be reasonably accurate, but this accuracy would be based on stereotype, not

empathy. We might rate our neighbors as high in sociability on the basis of assimilative projection and frequently be right, but this accuracy would not have much to do with empathy, either. Accuracy can also be based on response biases. If I always rate everybody high on friendliness because it is a socially acceptable trait and the group I rate happens to be full of friendly people, my rating will be accurate but not based on empathy. I have a philosophical objection to calling accuracy of person perception empathy. A really good con man is a very accurate perceiver of his "mark," and I hate to see success in conning people as one definition of empathy. That just is not what I mean by empathy.

Empathy is a very important concept in the area of psychotherapy. In a number of recent publications, the three characteristics associated with the successful therapist are genuineness, nonpossessive warmth, and accurate empathy. Of the three, by far the most research has been done on accurate empathy, a concept developed directly from the nondirective therapy approach of Carl Rogers. Rogers has always seen the main job of the therapist as understanding the patient's feelings and experience from the patient's own frame of reference and communicating this understanding by reflecting the patient's feelings back to him/her.[10]

In more advanced levels of accurate empathy the therapist verbalized feelings and experiences that the patient is having at this moment but which are not now in the patient's consciousness. My reaction to the concept of accurate empathy is that I'm bothered by the descriptive adjective "accurate." For me, if it is not accurate, then it is not empathy. An inaccurate guess at someone's feelings is at best a misguided or misplaced sympathy, rather than a form of empathy.

In the past five years or so, the area of psychology that has fostered the biggest surge in the importance of empathy is the field of moral development. Some of our social rules are morally justified as promoting the common good. To teach children altruism, we often try to get them to put themselves in the other person's shoes. Questions such as, "How would you like it if someone did that to you?" teach children to consider the implications of their actions for the welfare of others. Altruism and the moral point of view then, are close relatives to empathy. Empathy is a necessary preliminary stage to them.

When any concept comes of age in psychology, it is studied in its own right. Theorizing psychologists are not the "wee timerous beasties" of which Robert Burns spoke. Undaunted by the lack of agreement on exactly what empathy is or by our inability to clearly

differentiate it from many similar concepts, personality psychologists have gone right out and studied and theorized about empathy and its development. I have a lot of empathy for them, since if we wait until we fully understand and could define and deliniate a concept before we study it, we would not ever be ready to explore any concept in research or in theory. Also a precedent has been set in the area of moral development. Researchers and theory builders in this highly socially significant area decided to ignore the issue of defining moral virtue at least temporarily. Since consensus about moral virtue is far away, they put the problem aside to get about the business of finding out as much as they can about moral development.

Hogan, whose measure of empathy we will take up later, studied the development of empathy through the study of its antecedents.[11] He indicated that having to adopt alternative perspectives about somewhat inconsistent parents should help a child to develop empathy and role-taking skills. Thus, overindulgent parents or consistently rejecting parents would probably make development of their children's natural empathy difficult. Then, a relative absence of repression or denial—an openness and willingness to become aware of and to attend to our own intuitions and to our emotions and internal states seems to contribute to higher levels of empathy. Finally, a willingness to act on empathic perceptions probably depends on two prior conditions: having received empathy from someone at some time in one's life; and enduring the right amount of ridicule, injustice and betrayal or persecution to make a lasting impression but not so much that it damages self-esteem. It sounds like Freud was right when he suggested that the proper balance between frustration and gratification is what is needed to progress from one stage of personality development to the next. It is likely that the development of empathy, like cognitive development, is probably pretty much completed by late adolescence.

Another possible way to come to a better understanding of empathy is to look at the measures of empathy. Defining concepts by measures was carried to its lofical extreme in the hey day of "operational definition" which peaked when I was in graduate school. Operationalism rigidly maintained that a concept is nothing more than the operations by which it is measured. My reaction then and now is that if concepts like IQ and empathy are nothing more than test scores, then they really are not interesting enough to spend much time studying. I remember one of the high points of my graduate training was when a philosopher of science gave a talk

to the faculty and students about operational definitions. His text was that if a concept does not have any surplus meaning (that is, if it does not mean more than the measurement operations) it can not have any general applicability and the name of the game of science is to find generalizations which will help us to understand and predict the myriad of specific events in our world. He got a standing ovation from the graduate students but a much less exuberant one from the faculty. Fortunately, pure operationalism is pretty much ancient history.

Even though empathy is more than the tests by which we measure it, and the tests will not tell us all we wanted to know about empathy but were afraid or too confused to ask, looking at the tests might just help us to understand and define empathy a little better. Before getting into the specific tests, I am going to discuss the psychometric (testing) theory. In some senses, "moral virtue" has been defined in testing and psychological tests strive mightily for two main signs of nobility called *reliabilty* and *validity*. Both are measured by a variety of methods which can sometimes give differing answers. The gist of that last statement is that reliability and validity, like empathy and most other psychological concepts, do not have a single, always applicable definition. Still, the various measures of reliability have a lot in common, as do those of validity. Reliability can be defined as consistency of measurement. The question is, if you measure the same characteristic which is at the same level on two occasions, do you get very nearly the same score. Consistently measuring whatever you are measuring is a necessary but not sufficient cause to call a test virtuous. Low reliability indicates that there is a lot of error in the measurement and if a test score has a lot of error, it can not be doing a very good job of measuring what you want it to measure.

To achieve virtue a test must not only have a high reliability, but also high validity. Validity specifically addresses the question of whether the test is measuring what you say it is measuring. If a test of empathy has been found to have a high reliability and therefore has reasonably little error in it, the scores would then be compared with other criterion scores independent of test scores. When one is available, you would simply correlate the same peoples' scores on some other very good measure of empathy (e.g., therapy supervisor's rating of empathy). When another good measure of what you are measuring is not readily available (which is often the case or else why would you be making up a new test?) you can use another method involving correlations with several criterion measures. To establish *convergent* validity, our empathy test scores would be

related to a number of measures that empathy should be strongly associated with. We might correlate our empathy test scores with accuracy of interpersonal perception, excellence as a psychotherapist, and advanced moral development. If people's empathy scores were highly related to their scores on these characteristics we would say that our test of empathy had convergent validity. Ideally, then we would correlate our empathy scores with scores on other traits with which empathy should not be highly related. If the correlations with these latter measures are lower than those used to establish convergent validity (that is, if the tests correlate higher with things it should correlate with than it does with things it should not correlate with), the test would be said to have *discriminant* validity. Any test with high reliability and good convergent and discriminant validity, has established its psychometric virtue.

One method of rating accurate empathy used a number of patient's statements taken from therapy transcripts along with a number of interpretations the person can choose from. (See Appendix) Egan gives an example of this approach:[12]

> "My teacher told me today that I've done better work than she ever expected. I always thought that I could be good at studies if I really tried. So I risked it this semester, and it paid off."
>
> This person feels
> a. disillusioned b. vengeful c. skeptical d. competent e. successful f. unsure g. patient h. gratified i. jealous j.tolerant k. cautious l. annoyed

The person's accuracy of interpretations is rated on a 9-point scale. Chinsky and Rappaport assessed the meaning and reliability of the Accurate Empathy Scale and suggested it may also reflect qualities other than empathy, like the strength of the therapists' commitment to the patient.[13] Apparently, accurate empathy as measured by this test, includes factors other than empathy in the usual sense.

In person perception, empathy is usually measured by how well the person is able to predict the responses that another person will give on a test or questionnaire. This measure has three main problems. First there is the previously mentioned variety of extraneous factors which can increase or decrease the accuracy, independent of the judges' observation of the person, (e.g., stereotypes and assimilative projection). The second problem with the accuracy of perception measure mentioned earlier is the lack of ability to differentiate the talented con man from the gifted

psychotherapist. Finally, agreement between the judges predictions and the actual responses of the person being predicted has also been used as a measure of identification. This makes identification and empathy operationally identical. That is not very good discriminant validity for the measure as a method for assessing either concept.

Measures of empathy from the field of moral development are based on the ability to take the roles of another person. Some theorists in this field see empathy as the same as role-taking ability. This would make all great actresses and actors, the ultimate empathizers. There seem to be quite a few stars of stage, screen and video who are extremely talented in acting and still so insensitive to others that they run rough shod over everyone around them.

The Hogan Empathy Test was empirically derived.[14] (See Appendix) In this test, 68 statements were selected from among 957 items from the California Psychological Inventory, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, plus some other selected items. The statements were answered true or false by 211 people previously rated as high or low in empathy. The final items were selected empirically, purely on the basis of their ability to distinguish between the high and low empathy people. The best discriminating statement was number 57 "As a rule I have little difficulty in putting myself in other people's shoes." Because of its strictly empirical approach to selection some unexpected items were included. For instance, you receive a higher empathy score if you like poetry, like to talk about sex, are not afraid of deep water, prefer a shower to a bath, are a good mixer, and did not like to play hop-scotch.

The Hogan test scores showed congruent validity by direct relationships with social acuity, skill at playing charades, ethical sensitivity and maturity of moral judgment, social presence, ego strength, flexibility, and tolerance; and by negative relationships to alienation, social introversion, anxiety and general maladjustment.

Discriminant validity for the Hogan Empathy scale was shown by the lack of relationships of empathy with socialization, IQ, life styles, values and nonconformity. Last but not least, the Hogan test scores correlated directly and strongest of all with ratings of empathy.

People scoring high in empathy are characterized as likable, friendly, charming, poised, tactful, outgoing, warm and at ease with people. Low scorers on empathy seem aloof, disaffected, bitter and disposed to alienate others by being quarrelsom, argumentative, and unkind.

Now that we have come through this mass of information on the use and measurement of empathy by psychologists, where are we? The one thing I know for sure at this point is that we are not in heaven. In terms of the concept of empathy, I can only tell you where I am and give you my potential solution to the question of what is empathy. My choice is to focus on differentiating empathy from the concepts with which it overlaps. One of four aspects of what Peck and Havighurst called empathy is my choice for how empathy shoud be defined: That is, "the capacity for feeling with others and experiencing their emotions of this moment to some degree."[15] Although this definition restricts empathy quite a bit, it helps to differentiate empathy from most, if not all, of the concepts with which it overlaps.

Sympathy does not include shared emotion only "knowing how the other feels." Interpersonal perception includes and is heavily a cognitive experience, a judgment, and does not include shared feelings. Empathy can help the process of judgment but is not identical with it. Empathy is differentiated from identification in that empathy is less permanent and does not include acceptance of the attitudes and values of the other person. It is differentiated from role-playing as empathy is specifically an unconcious sharing of another's emotions or feelings. Empathy, in the restricted definition I have suggested, can be differentiated from the creative artist's projection of feelings because it is defined as "adoptive." The appreciation of a creative work has a strong component of the viewer empathically sharing the artist's emotion at the time of the creation through experiencing the reproduction of that emotion in the work. In psychotherapy, the shared emotion is differentiated from the therapist's communication of his understanding of the patient's experience and from his commitment to the patient.

There are many indications that empathy is enhanced by meditation, Gestalt self-awareness exercises and increased subjective self-awareness in general. Although subjective self-awareness (i.e., experiencing oneself as a "flow" or a continuous process does not involve anybody else, it enables one at other times to share another's emotions more easily and fully.

The last issue I want to address, is the question of whether empathy can be a conscious experience. I believe it can be as long

as it is experienced as subjective self-awareness and is not studied or analyzed.

What does this restricted definition do to empathy? Some may say it has lost too much, but I prefer to say it has become more distinguished. It has been distinguished from other similar concepts and achieved a clearer and more individual identity. Maturity has been defined as the capacity to laugh at things we love and still love them. Stretching the analogy a bit, I am going to say that we should help empathy and our own maturity by restricting it, but continuing to love it. Despite the restriction to shared feelings, it is still a beautifully positive, humanistic concept and it is still very easy to love.

ACCURATE EMPATHY EXERCISE

From: G. Egan, *Exercises in Helping Skills: A Training Manual to Accompany the Skilled Helper* (Monterey, California: Brooks Cole, 1975), pp. 31-2.

Exercise 14—The passive discrimination of feelings

Directions—Circle the adjectives that accurately identify the speaker's FEELINGS in the following statements.

1. "These counseling sessions have really done me a great deal of good I enjoy my work more. I actually look forward to meeting new people. My husband and I are talking more directly and seriously and decently to each other. There's just so much more freedom in my life!"

   This person feels
   a. awful b. good c. uncertain d. cautious e. great f. moody g. on top of the world h. perplexed i. excited j. delighted k. alive.

2. My husband and I just decided to get a divorce. (Pause) I really don't look forward to the legal part of it—to ANY part of it. And to tell you the truth, I just don't know what to expect. (Pause) I'm well into middle age. I don't think another marriage is possible. (Pause) I just don't know what to expect."

   This person feels
   a. assured b. depressed c. pleased d. sad e. brave f. downcast g. discouraged h. worried i. strong

3. "My best friend has just turned her back on me. And I don't even know why. From the way she acted, I think she thinks I've been talking behind her back. Damn! This neighborhood is full of gossips. I hope she hasn't been listening to those foulmouths who just want to stir up trouble."

   This person feels
   a. angry b. elated c. put out d. enthusiastic e. congenial f. confident g. agitated h. confused

4. "My teacher told me today that I've done better work that she ever expected. I always thought that I could be good at studies if I really tried. So I risked it this semester, and it paid off!"
This person feels
a. disillusioned b. vengeful c. skeptical d. competent e. successful f. unsure g. patient h. gratified i. jealous j. tolerant k. cautious l. annoyed

Exercise 14: Responses:

1. b,e,g,h,i,k 2. b,d,f,g,h 3 a,c,g,h 4. d,e,h

HOGAN EMPATHY SCALE

From: R. Hogan, "Development of an Empathy Scale," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psycholgy 33 (1969), 306-16.*

1. A person needs to "show off" a little now and then.
2. I liked "Alice in Wonderland" by Lewis Carroll.
3. Clever, sarcastic people make me feel very uncomfortable.
4. I usually take an active part in the entertainment at parties.
5. I feel sure that there is only one true religion.
6. I am afraid of deep water.
7. I must admit I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want.
8. I have at one time or another in my life tried my hand at poetry writing.
9. Most of the arguments or quarrels I get into are over matters of principle.
10. I would like the job of foreign correspondent for a newspaper.
11. People today have forgotten how to feel properly ashamed of themselves.
12. I prefer a shower to a bathtub.
13. I always try to consider the other fellow's feelings before I do something.
14. I usually don't like to talk much unless I am with people I know very well.
15. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.
16. I like to keep people guessing what I'm going to do next.

17. Before I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to it.

18. I like to talk before groups of people.

19. When a man is with a woman he is usually thinking about things related to her sex.

20. Only a fool would try to change our American way of life.

21. My parents were always very strict and stern with me.

22. Sometimes I rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things I'm not supposed to do.

23. I think I would like to belong to a singing club.

24. I think I am usually a leader in my group.

25. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.

26. I don't like to work on a problem unless there is the possibility of coming out with a clear-cut non-ambiguous answer.

27. It bothers me when something unexpected interrupts my daily routine.

28. I have a natural talent for influencing people.

29. I don't really care whether people like me or dislike me.

30. The trouble with many people is that they don't take things seriously enough.

31. It is hard for me just to sit still and relax.

32. Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about.

33. I feel that it is certainly best to keep my mouth shut when I'm in trouble.

34. I am a good mixer.

35. I am an important person.

36. I like poetry.

37. My feelings are not easily hurt.

38. I have met problems so full of possibilities that I have been unable to make up my mind about them.

39. Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and grouchy.

40. What others think of me does not bother me.

41. I would like to be a journalist.

42. I like to talk about sex.

43. My way of doing things is apt to be misunderstood by others.

44. Sometimes without any reason or even when things are going wrong I feel excitedly happy, "on top of the world."

45. I like to be with a crowd who play jokes on one another.

46. My mother or father often made me obey even when I thought that it was unreasonable.

47. I easily become impatient with people.

48. Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons I love.

49. I tend to be interested in several different hobbies rather than stick to one of them for a long time.

50. I am not easily angered.

51. People have often misunderstood my intentions when I was trying to put them right and be helpful.

52. I am usually calm and not easily upset.

53. I would certainly enjoy beating a crook at his own game.

54. I am often so annoyed when someone tries to get ahead of me in a line of people that I speak to him about it.

55. I used to like hopscotch.

56. I have never been made especially nervous over trouble that any members of my family have gotten into.

57. As a rule I have little difficulty in "putting myself into other people's shoes."

58. I have seen some things so sad that I almost felt like crying.

59. Disobedience to the government is never justified.

60. It is the duty of a citizen to support his country, right or wrong.

61. I am usually rather short-tempered with people who come around and bother me with foolish questions.

62. I have a pretty clear idea of what I would try to impart to my students if I were a teacher.

63. I enjoy the company of strong-willed people.

64. I frequently undertake more than I can accomplish.

HIGH EMPATHY ANSWERS

True: 1,2,4,8,9,10,12,13,15,17,18,22,23,24,28,34,36,38,41, 42,44,45,48,49,50,52,53,57,58,62,63,64.

False: 3,5,6,7,11,14,16,19,20,21,25,26,27,29,30,31,32,33,35, 37,39,40,43,46,47,51,54,55,56,59,60,61.

FOOTNOTES

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[10]C.R. Rogers, *Counseling and Psychotherapy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951).

[11]R. Hogan, "Development of an Empathy Scale," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 33 (1969), 307-16.

[12]G. Egan, *Exercises in Helping Skills: A Training Manual to Accompany THE SKILLED HELPER* (Monterey, California: Brooks-Cole, 1975), pp. 31-32.

[13]J.M. Chinsky and J. Rappaport, "A Brief Critique of the Meaning and Reliability of 'Accurate Empathy' Ratings," *Psychological Bulletin* 73 (1970), 379-82.

[14] Hogan, 307-16.

[15]R.F. Pech and R.J. Havighurst, *The Psychology of Child Development* (New York: Wiley, 1960), p. 211.

Gilda Parrella

EMPATHY IN THE WORKS OF DYLAN THOMAS

Empathy is a psychological process which has as its consequence the communication of feeling and emotions through verbal and non-verbal modes of expression.[1] As a psychological process it has been studied mainly in interactional contexts to illuminate human behavior. However, some prelimanary study has been made to determine how empathy works in language as verbal (substantive) and non-verbal (structural) expression in literature.[2] Applying what we know of this psychological process to the written language of literature allows us to recognize empathy both as process and as process embodied in fixed language forms. In such application, essential characteristics remain constant; the process involves mimesis, duplication, and repetition of action.[3] Thus words and forms which embody these characteristics can instigate the process in the perceiver whether (s)he is responding to language and/or behavior which exist(s) in life or in literature. This paper attempts to apply and illuminate this theory with some specific examples of the writings of Dylan Thomas, a writer noted for his conventional and unconventional uses of language and structure.

Thomas' writings not only reflect an empathic attitude toward man and nature but also illustrate empathy in poetic technique. The themes of many of Thomas' writings, including poetry, narrative, and drama, are dominated by the empathic belief that "all things participate in all others because natural changes involve the constant shifting of particles of matter from one form of life to another."[4] Thomas is able to see man participating and "feeling into" nature, not because man and nature are two distinct and separate entities but because man and nature are very much alike. The cyclical forces which work in nature are like the ones that work in man: man is born (spring), he grows (summer), he ages (autumn), he dies (winter), he is reborn (spring). The poet may project his own life-cycle into nature, or he may adopt from nature concrete imagery to make clear his own existence. The imagery used in lines from a variety of Thomas' poems illustrates this empathic view that man and nature are essentially one. This man-nature metaphor itself is at once empathic in content (since man is seen to be like nature) and empathic in the perception of that content (since to understand the meaning, the mimetic "twinning" process calls upon the empathic instinct).[5]

One poem which clearly illustrates both "projective" and "adoptive" empathy is "The Force That Through The Green Fuse Drives the Flower."[6] Consider the following metaphors:

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The force that through the green fuse drives the flower
Drives my green age: that blasts the roots of trees
Is my destroyer....

The force that drives the water through the rocks
Drives my red blood; that dries the mouthing streams
Turns mine to wax....

The hand that whirls the water in the pool
Stirs the quicksand; that ropes the blowing wind
Hauls my shroud sail....

In each of these images, the metaphoric transference is made empathically between two circumstances which are in some ways alike; the force itself is, in nature as in man, creative and destructive. Man feels the inevitability of his fate because of the force which takes its toll from our being and life-substance just as it takes its toll from nature. Our veins, bodies, and blood, like the roots, rocks, and rivers suffer together and are one. The force is generative in vines and flowera; it is generative in man in his power to survive. But the force is also destructive; it "blasts the roots of trees," "stirs the quicksand," and hoists our shrouds. And yet, despite its conflicting elements, the force is one; the cyclical unity between man and nature exists *because* our "clay is made of the hangman's lime."

This belief in a "unified state of existence between man and nature where there is no death,"[7] is especially evident in what Ralph Maud calls "process poems" in which "images are used to express process."[8] These poems are basically empathic because they objectify action, action which itself is the result of the empathic process of projection in the poet's imagery. Such imagery appeals to more than the aural and visual senses; it appeals, as well, to the kinaesthetic and kinetic senses which are sensitive to external and objectified states of being and action. Let us look at some verb usages in "A Process in the Weather of the Heart," which exemplify kinaesthetic and kinetic imagery:

A process in the weather of the heart
Turns damp to dry; the golden shot
Storms in the freezing tomb.
A weather in the quarter of the veins
Turns night to day; blood in their suns
Lights up the living worm.

A process in the eye forwarns
The bones of blindness; and the womb
Drives in a death as life leaks out.

A darkness in the weather of the eye
Is half its light; the fathomed sea
Breaks on unangled land.....

A weather in the flesh and bone
Is damp and dry; the quick and dead
Move like two ghosts before the eye.....

A process blows the moon into the sun,
Pulls down the shabby curtains of the skin;
And the heart gives up its dead.[9]

This poem allows a vivid empathic response to the forces of life due, in part, to the activity and intensity of the verbs, "storms," "drives," "breaks," "blows," and "pulls." Even some of the nouns ("process" and "weather") suggest activity. Where there is submission, the verbs are static rather than active. The basic tension of the poem is created by the conflict between the constructive and destructive elements which alternate their dominance. The forces of life ("golden shot," "weather," "blood") have active verbs ("storms," "turns," " light"), while the forces of death ("darkness," "the quick and the dead") have more static verb images ("is" "move like two ghosts"). The kinaesthetic impact of such word usages, in addition to the mimetic transference of the metaphoric comparison between nature's seasons and the heart's weather, cause an empathic response on two levels: we at once receive the *content* comparison between man and mature as verbal empathy, and we receive the *formal* impact of the kinaesthetic perception in a kind of non-verbal empathy.

The same kinds of non-verbal (formal) and verbal (substantive) empathy are also at work in other poems, including "Light Breaks Where No Sun Shines" which uses the same man-nature metaphor and similar kinetic and kinaesthetic verbs.

Light breaks where no sun shines;
Where no sea runs, the water of the heart
Push in their tides;
And, broken ghosts with glow-worms in their heads,
The things of light
File through the flesh were no flesh decks the bones....[10]

This poem contains a series of action verbs including "breaks," "runs," and "push." In addition, it contains a series of paradoxes and ironies which are essentially empathic because the perception of their meaning depends upon our ability to project ourselves into a mental world other than the familiar one. Further, there is a formal, alternating rhythm in this series of paradoxical reversals which the listener can perceive when the poem is performed aloud. The performance rhythm itself may be established to reinforce perceptions about the content which is itself composed of rhythmic oppositions.

Thomas' methods of illustrating empathy lead to an abundance of the poetic techniques of symbolism, metaphor, kinaesthetic imagery, and paradox. In his book, *Dylan Thomas*, Jacob Korg says that "Thomas' way of extending and linking his metaphors is a further indication of the kinship between his rhetoric and the functioning of the primitive imagination. His imagery seems to be the product of a process like 'fusion'—Frederick Clarke Prescott has described as characteristic of mythic thought. 'Sun and man were fancied alike....the two fused or grew vitally into one....' "[11] This process "like 'fusion' " functions mimetically as empathy and produces unity from duality, a merging into a self, resulting in a new totality that is, in many ways like each of the fused elements.

Elder Olson, in *The Poetry of Dylan Thomas*, places unusual importance on symbolism as a means Thomas uses to reveal insights which the reader perceives "by the act of intuition."[12] Olson considers the symbols more powerful than the metaphor which merely "involves verbal substitution," while the symbol substitutes "ideas." The symbol can be seen as an appropriate tool for Thomas to illustrate an empathic attitude because it "can cause us to entertain ideas remote from ordinary experience, by the extension of ideas we already possess; thus mystics tend to use symbols in their descriptions of the mystical experience precisely because that experience is an extraordinary one."[13]

Symbolism relies upon empathy because perception of it depends upon the empathic transference of qualities from one object or condition to another. Thus, whenever symbols occur in the literary object, the reader appears to transfer mimetically the psychological foundation of the verbal symbol to the object of the transference. Thomas' symbols follow the themes of many of his metaphors. The forces of life, death, and rebirth in man and in nature rely in his symbolism, as in his metaphors, upon traditional myths which he develops in unique and personal ways. Traditionally, water and the sea are considered to represent life-giving and

life-sustaining elements; winter, darkness, and night often represent death. Thomas builds on the life-giving elements of water and sea and creates additional symbols like marrow, oil, greenness, and tides; he expands death-imagery through symbols like wax, worms, maggots, and wind. As one encounters such symbols, in their immediate and concrete forms which are based on various abstractions, one experiences a sensory response as well as an empathic transference. In one word, a whole world of experience and association may be re-awakened.

The symbols "Eden" and "green genesis" in the following lines from the poem "To-day, This Insect," make the abstraction of the struggle in the creative process more concrete:

> To-day, this insect, and the world I breathe,
> Now that my symbols have outelbowed space,
> Time at the city spectacles, and half
> The dear, daft time I take to nudge the sentence,
> In trust and tale have I divided sense,
> Slapped down the guillotine, the blood-red double
> Of head and tail made witnesses to this
> Murder of Eden and green genesis.
>
> The insect certain is the plague of fables....[14]

At once we are pulled out of our world into another; we reenact by "feeling into" the circumstances which "Eden" and "green genesis" represent. We re-experience all the paradise, the innocence, the promise—all these things lost in a repetition of a familiar act which is here, symbolically, the act of the murder of sense which the persona experiences in the process of writing a poem. The word "insect," too, acts as symbol for a poem; in addition, it acts as a metaphor for the carrier of the fabled plague.

One basic empathic tool which is indispensible to the poet-author is his ability to create and "feel into" characters that differ from himself. This empathic ability is dependent upon the powers of the poetic imagination which Aristotle advises the playwright to develop by outward physical gesture and activity. The poetic imagination which leads to the creation of Thomas' symbolism is filled with the empathic response. Elder Olson notes that Thomas'

> imagination is first of all a strange one, an odd one; he sees things quite differently from the way in which we should. We

> should see flowers on a grave; he sees the dead 'who periscope through flowers to the sky.' He looks into what we should find opaque, looks down at something we are wont to look up at, looks up where we should look down, peers in where we should peer out, and out where we should look in.[15]

Each of these acts of vision suggests the use of empathy, the ability to see and "feel into" things from other perspectives. Thus, the objects that Thomas sees from these perspectives become symbols which not only act as substitutions for ideas but allow the reader to align himself with this newly found viewpoint in order to perceive the significance of the object-symbol. Thomas' poetic imagination "transports (the reader) into the mysteries of the womb; it informs him how the child feels at the moment of birth, how the fetus feels during its process of development...how all would feel and think if they were prescient of the whole of life...He penetrates into the mind of God before the Creation, and can feel what would be felt by the scattered particles of a universe utterly dissolved."[16] Thomas' poetic imagination is thus dependent upon empathy as the primary activity from which he derives much of his thematic material, imagery, symbolism, and varying points of view.

Many examples of empathy in point of view can be found in Thomas' poetry in the various characters appearing in poem from *Collected Poems*: "Lament" (the aging "old ram rod"); "Fern Hill" (the adult recalling his innocent childhood); " 'If My Head Hurt a Hair's Foot' " (the baby, born); "Twenty-Four Years" (the baby about to be born); "Before I Knocked" (the liquid of life); "How Shall My Animal" (various animals in embryonic stages).[17]

In *The Craft and Art of Dylan Thomas*, William T. Moynahan speaks of other voices in Thomas' poetry including those of the " 'spinner'—the weaver of magic tales, the singer, the bard, the prophet"; the autobiographical voice in "Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night," "I Make This in a Warring Absence," "This Side of Truth," and the birthday poems, "Poem on His Birthday," and "Poem in October"; the voice of the poet, in "Especially When the October Winds," "In My Craft or Sullen Art," and "On No Work of Words"; the voice of everyman in which Thomas "shifts characters and point of view as the poem demands."[18] John Graddon, in a review of *Collected Poems*, also notes Thomas' empathic ability when he says, "with Dylan Thomas the work comes from the one person who is many persons, whose work may even prove to reflect all persons. *It is the projection of a personality in process of finding universality, not only in many*

people but in all the strata of consciousness of one human being–the poet himself"[19]

EMPATHY EMBODIED IN UNIQUE FORMS

Thomas' distinction as a writer probably will rest upon his individualistic use of language which achieves at once a balance between "meaningless exuberance" and "self-conscious precision."[20] John Bayley states, in *The Romantic Survival*, that "the consciousness of the reader (probably) can adapt itself to such a variety of linguistic uses and such a multiplicity of verbal stimuli," that the need for language to become more complex is necessary in order to force into the light "the inchoate mass of vague awareness which lies below the level of thought and speech."[21] Such appears to be the case with some of Thomas' unique uses of language and structure.

Throughout all of Thomas' writings, despite the variety of literary forms, one characteristic remains clear: the identifiable and uncommon uses of language dominated by a profound love of words, words first as sound, then as symbol; words, as Thomas says, to be carved, moulded, polished, and planed "into patterns, sequences, sculpture, fugues of sound expressing some lyrical impulse, some special doubt or conviction, some dimly-realized truth" finally to be reached and realized.[22]

As one studies Thomas and his works, it becomes increasingly evident that most forms of his literary writings (with the possible exception of some of his short stories), rely heavily upon a kind of empathic translation of the written word into action in the reader, action of a kinaesthetic or kinetic response and, on occasion, action as translation from written word to spoken. Words awed and fascinated Thomas who, as a child, listened to nursery rhymes, fairy tales, the rolling words of Welsh preachers, and found delight in the sound and their "actions" in his ears despite the lack of meaning. He was "completely absorbed in the mystery of language, in the latent powers of words and the magic of their substitution," says Vernon Watkins.[23] As thomas learned to read, the words on the pafe, "seemingly lifeless, made only of black and white" brought with them "out of their own being...love and terror and pity and pain and wonder and all the other vague abstractions that make our ephemeral lives dangerous, great, and bearable."[24]

Thomas noted early the kinaesthetic, empathic impact in words which "made their own original associations as they sprang and shone," words that "hummed, strummed, jugged and galloped

along."[25] The kinaesthetic and kinetic qualities that Thomas felt in words were partly due to his own projection of action into them, and partly due to the physical impact of sound and rhythm upon the inner ear of the mind which resides in external objects as well as internally in the mind of the perceiver. As a child, Thomas was fascinated by the sound and action of words; as the poet, he worked to instill this sense of action and movement into the words and structures of his works. Thomas insisted that the best way "to render a thought or action, however abstract, was to express it in as physical a way as possible. Every thought, for him, could find an equivalent in blood, flesh, and gland. He saw it as his particular task to find and express all the equations between body and world, between body and idea."[26] One Critic notes that contacts with Thomas' poetry often leave the reader exhauster because Thomas

> attacks his reader physically. In characteristic first lines (the reader) is called upon to act (O' make me a wall and a mask...'), to response kinesthetically ('the spire cranes'), to feel the impact, thudding or sharp, of dentals ('If my head hurt a hair's foot'), literally to widen and narrow his eyes (in 'Vision and Prayer'), to participate in intimate activities ('I dreamed my genesis in sweat of sleep'). His breath taken away from this sudden attack, he is kept breathless by the periodicity of the sentence which follows.[27]

Thomas uses all the evocative and empathic devices available. He says,

> I am a painstaking, conscientious, involved and devious craftsman in words, however unsuccessful the result so often appears, and to whatever wrong uses I may apply my technical paraphernalia. I use everything and anything to make my poems work and move in the direction I want them to: old tricks, new tricks, puns, portmanteau-words, paradox, allusion, paronomasia, paragram, catachresis, slang, assonantal rhymes, vowel rhymes, sprung rhythm. Every device there is in language is there to be used if you will.[28]

Let us look at some example of these devices which capture empathic action in original word-usages.[29] In *Under Milk Wood*,[30] a piece which combines characteristic elements of dramatic, narrative, and poetic forms, there are abundant example of words and word-combinations which are empathic; these words and combinations imitate the sound of the action involved and create a

distinctive and appropriate rhythm which often imitates the rhythm of the original action itself. In the following passage from *Under Milk Wood*, Thomas has brought together meaning and form by the creation and use of onomatopoetic words and rhythms which embody empathically and activity and style of the town's morning:

> There's the clip clop of horses on the sunhoneyed cobbles of the humming streets, hammering of horseshoes, gobble quack and cackle, tomtit twitter from the bird-ounced boughs, braying on Donkey Down. Bread is baking, pigs are grunting, chop goes the butcher, milk-churns bell, tills ring, sheep cough, dogs shout, saws sing. On, the Spring whinny and morning moo from the clog-dancing farms, and gulls' gab and rabble on the boat-bobbing river and sea and the cockles bubbling in the sand, scamper of sanderlings, curlew cru, crow caw, pigeon coo, clock strike, bull bellew, and the ragged gabble of the bear-garden school as the women scratch and babble in Mrs. Organ Morgan's general shop where everything is sold: custard, parafin, hatchets, whistles.[31]

Thomas also creates livly empathy through the use of combined and hyphenated words as in "Now, woken at last by the out-of-bed-sleepy-head-Polly-put-the-kettle-on-townhall bell...."[32] The long string of hyphenated words followed by the three short spondaic beats of "townhall bell" suggest a lively sound picture imitating the sleeper's alarm and confusion at an abrupt awakening and the insistent sound of the bell itself.

Rhythm is the dominant method used to evoke empathic response in this narrative passage where actions accumulate without significant pause to relieve the breathless participation of the characters involved, and the reader himself:

> And the shrill girls giggle and master around him and squeal as they clutch and thrash, and he blubbers away downhill with his patched pants falling, and his tear-splashed blush burns all the way as the triumphant bird-like sisters scream with buttons in their claws and the bully brothers hoot after him his little nickname and his mother's shame and his father's wickedness with the loose wild barefoot women of the hovels of the hills.[33]

Besides using accumulated details, hyphenated words, and sound imitations to evoke empathic action in the reader, Thomas

converts certain nouns and adjectives into action by making them into verbs. For example: "Clouds sag and *pillow* on*Llareggub Hill*"; "Gossamer Beynon *high-heels* out of school"; "Outside, the sun *springs* down on the rough and tumbling town."[34] Such usage forces the reader to re-examine the conventional grammatical functioning of the words, to recognize *process* in the noun and *process* in the verb, then to transfer action into traditionally non-action words. For example, "clouds sag and pillow on Llareggub Hill," serves to illustrate the impact of this process of "conversion." We are familiar with the word "sag" as a verb and, although the denotations and connotations may add to the imagery of the cloud because it is an animated and personified projection, the use of the word "pillow" as a verb makes a more striking image, calling upon the kinaesthetic sense in a way which we had not encountered in "sag." We must take all the attributes of the sensory experiences of "pillow," in all its physicality and objectness, and empathize these characteristics into a verb; that is, we must create action by projecting from one kind of sensory experience into another. Thus, all the connotations of the word follow the "conversion" but with the added impact of being conceived and experienced as an action or process.

The same response occurs in other examples which are typical of many such usages throughout Thomas' writings. "Gossamer Heynon *high-heels* out of school"; this novel vision is more vivid than the picture that might result from "Gossamer Beynon *walks* out of school in high heels," since in order for us to perceive the meaning, we must "feel into" the action which is implicit in the denotation and connotations of the physicality of the object, "high-heels." "Outside, the sun *springs down* on the rough and tumbling town" is a more complex example of this process because at first it would appear that the action is already in the word "springs" as a verb. But the kind of action intended is the action implied in the noun "springtime," since the verb "to spring" denotes a sudden movement *upwards*. Instead, this usage enables the poet to invest and project all the qualities of rebirth, newness, and regeneration into a process which is controlled by the sun and visited upon the town.

A paper of this kind can only begin to apply the process of empathy to the language in literature. It can begin to establish some guidlines for study and application which may be extended to other authors in our search for meaning and understanding of literature. As interpreters, empathy is one of our major illuminating tools as we explore one art form (literature) by means of another

(performance). As we sensitize ourselves to the psychological processes working in language we expand the possibilities of illumination and commentary for our audiences as well as ourselves.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The concept of empathy is a complex one defined by artists, psychologists, aestheticians and philosophers. This paper does not attempt to explore the origins or definitions of the concept although the working definitions used in this paper are based on extensive explorations detailed in Gilda Parrella, "The Concept of Empathy: A Study in Discovery, Definition and Design" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Washington, 1969). Subsequent published articles by the author on this subject provide the background for the application of this theory to language in literature; i.e., "Projection and Adaption: Toward a Clarification of the Concept of Empathy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 42 (1971), 204-13. See also reference in footnote 2.

[2]For an elaboration of the empathic process in literary forms, Gilda Parrella, "Image and Mirror: Empathy in Language Devices," *Western Speech*, 36 (1972), 251-60.

[3]As a result of comparative study, these conditions described in various ways continue to appear in definitions of the empathic process. See, for example Bell, G.B. and R. Stolper, "An attempt at Validation of the Empathy Test," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 39 (1955); Katz, Rovert. *Empathy: Its Nature and Uses*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1963; Lipps, Theodor. *Psychological Studies*. trans. H.C. Sanborn. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1926; Ong, Walter. "Metaphor and the Twinned Vision," *Sewanee Review*, 63 (September, 1955), 193-201; Rader, Melvin. ed., *A Modern Book of Aesthetics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1935; Thorpe, C.D. "Some Notices of 'Empathy' before Lipps." *Papers of the Michigan Academy*. Ann Arbor, 1938.

[4]Jacob Korg, *Dylan. Thomas* (New York: Twayne, 1965), p. 29.

[5]Ong, op. cit., 193-201.

[6]Dylan Thomas, *Collected Poems* (New York: J. Laughlin, 1953), p. 10.

[7]William T. Moynihan, *The Craft and Art of Dylan Thomas* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 292.

[8]Ralph Maud, *Entrances to Dylan Thomas' Poetry* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963), p. 80.

[9]Thomas, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

[10]Ibid., p. 29-30

[11]Korg, op. cit., p. 29.

[12]Elder Olson, *The Poetry of Dylan Thomas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p.5.

[13]Ibid., p. 10

[14]Thomas, *Collected Poems*, pp. 47-48.

[15]Olson, op. cit., p. 12.

[16]Ibid., p. 12-13.

[17] Thomas, *Collect Poems*, pp. 194-6, 27-8, 178-80, 108-9, 110, 8-9, 100-101.

[18]Moynihan, op. cit., pp. 94-5.

[19]John Graddon, "The Interior Life" in *Dylan Thomas: The Legend and the Poet*, ed. E.W. Tedlock (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 215. My emphasis.

[20]John Bayley, *The Romantic Survival* (London: Constable, 1957), p. 210.

[21]Ibid., p. 213.

[22]Dylan Thomas, "Notes on the Art of Poetry," in *A Garland for Dylan Thomas*, ed. George Firmage (New York: Clarke and Way, 1963), p. 148.

[23]Dylan Thomas, "Afterword" in *Adventures in the Skin Trade* (Norfolk, Connecticut: New Directions, 1955), p. 184.

[24]Thomas, "Notes..." op. cit., pp. 147-8.

[25]Ibid., p. 148.

[26]According to Pamel Hansford Johnson: quoted in Moynihan, p. 48.

[27] Clark Emery, *The World of Dylan Thomas* (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1962), p. 14.

[28]Thomas, "Notes..." op. cit., p. 151.

[29]Several critics, including John Bayley and Geoffrey Moore note the debt Thomas appears to owe Hopkins, but even the most severe of the critics, Herbert Read, states that Thomas "has his own inscape, and...has made and exhibits technical discoveries that owe nothing to Hopkins." See Herbert Read, *The True Voice of Feeling* (London: Faber and Faber, 1953), p. 86.

[30]Dylan Thomas, *Under Milk Wood* (New York: New Directions, 1954).

[31]Ibid., p. 45.

[32]Ibid., p. 29.

[33]Ibid., p. 66.

[34]Ibid., pp. 73, 67, 52.

Empathy, The Kinesthetic Feel of Language, and Shakespeare's Sonnet 65*

William Craig Forrest

I am aware that the aesthetic doctrine of empathy as it has developed in this century and the last is, if not a hopeless tangle of confusions, at the least a very complicated set of questions[1] and that, among many important aestheticians and psychologists of art – for instance Rudolph Arnheim, Monroe Beardsley, Roman Ingarden Kurt Koffka, and Carroll Pratt to name a few[2] – it is now accounted a discredited theory. I feel – like Roman Ingarden[3] – that I cannot undertake to sort out the "fifty-seven varieties" of meaning which attach to the term, often in the writings of the same person – certainly not in a brief paper. Although I shall therefore firmly resist the temptation to tackle any of the major theoretical problems, I nevertheless find empathy an engaging subject at the practical levels of everyday life experience, literary criticism, and the performance doctrine of many of the most eminent oral interpreters. And it is this last level that I hope to make a modest, practical contribution.

That *something* deserving study happens in everyday life experience in the coalescence of subject and object to which the name *empathy* has been applied seems incontrovertible in the many examples brought forth by adherents of the empathy doctrine such as Clarence D. Thorpe's account of "one of the strongest empathic reponses of *his* life" occurring upon his hearing a description over the radio of a soldier's "smashing a prisoner's foot with the butt of his rifle."[4] Such examples can be endlessly multiplied and they no doubt serve as warrant for the widespread and casual use of the terms *empathy* and *empathic* in literary criticism. Among the standard handbook of literature which take the subject of empathy seriously and almost for granted are *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, Joseph T. Shipley's *Dictionary of World Literature*, and M.H. Abrams' admirable *A Glossary of Literary Terms*.[5] Oral Interpretation textbooks which make extensive use of the concept include those of Wallace A. Bacon, Robert Beloof, Don Geiger, and Charlotte Lee.[6] Chester Clayton Long's intriguing and illuminating notion of "sensory tracking" is, I believe, closely related to the idea of empathy.[7]

The working definition of empathy in this paper I take from Abrams for its astute avoidance of certain pitfalls. It is this:

Empathy . . . . signifies an experience in which one identifies himself with an object of perception and seems to participate in its

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physical sensations, expecially in sensations of bodily posture and motion.

The location of empathic response connected with literary performance has, of course, a considerable range. A character within the world of the literary artwork may have empathic response to an object which he or she perceives. Again the author may respond empathically to his material and succeed in expressing his empathy. The oral performer of a work in turn may empathize with something in the work and embody this response in the reading. The audience may empathize with the work in performance. And finally, closing the circle, the performer may empathize with the signals of response feeding back to him or her from the audience. This last situation is a wonderful thing, for the work is seemingly brought forth by a kind of miraculous teamwork between performer and audience. It bears some analogy to the oratorical consummation in which an audience captivated by a speaker shouts out its support, "Hear, hear" or "Amen," or "Right on" or (in closer analogy) joins the speaker's efforts in some such way as by chanting a refrain with him (e.g., Franklin Roosevelt's "Martin, Barton, and Fish") or, as we hear of ancient Greek audiences, stamping out the cadence of an utterly approved peroration.

The first quest for the student of oral interpretation, of course, is empathy with the literature which he is to read. And here, what is the object of the oral interpreter's empathic response? Usually it is suggested that the interpreter should strive for empathy with objects in the world of the work—with movements and with the muscular response to emotional material in the world of the verbal artwork.[9] And such directives, I wish to make clear, seem to be worthy of high approval and applause.

But I now wish to go further and to suggest here that the interpreter should also attempt to empathize with the physical feel of the very language of the work itself.[10]

Let me clarify this proposal by pointing out that the literary medium is a speech stream with three chief strata.[11] Besides the sematic stratum which through its conventionally specified meanings of words and syntax primarily creates the world of the work, we also have, at a second level, a sound stratum which in its silences as well as in its sounds supports those fictive meanings and thirdly a stratum of speech-producing bodily movements which both creates those sounds and expressive silences and additionally supports the sematic stratum and so the fictive world. The sound stratum and

the kinesthetically and tactilely perceptible stratum of articulation in their collaboration with the semantic stratum are the directly sensuous artistic medium of the work of literary art. If there is an aesthetic universal—a principle which is applicable to all the fine arts—surely Eduard Hanslick was right in his claim that "Every art sets out from the sensuous and operates within its limits."[12] Thus it is the sound and the kinesthetic and tactile feel of literature which afford its basic kinship with the other fine arts. And we must disabuse ourselves (if necessary) of the mistaken notion that these sensory elements are adventitious or in any way nonessentials. They are not merely, ornament, or cosmetics on the use of literature; they are her bones and lovely flesh in which alone her spirit lives if it lives at all. As Yeats warns himself:

> God guard me from those thoughts men think
> In the mind alone
> He that sings a lasting song
> Thinks in a marrow bone . . .[13]

Without specifying just the tripartite analysis of the literary speech stream which I have just made of semantic, sound, and articulatory strata, W.K. Wimsatt does speak, much to our present purpose, of "the peculiarly intimate and warmly colored (if 'conventional') relation which prevails between the physical and the symbolic sides of language."[14] Assuming that Wimsatt would have found no difficulty with my equating what I have called the semantic stratum of literary language with his "symbolic side," and further assuming that he would not have objected to my analysis of the "physical side" of literary language into the strata of speech-producing movements and speech sounds, I would like to quote what he goes on to say about the relationship between the symbolic and physical sides of language. They "are blended," he says, "in a system so spontaneous, so tacit, so pregnant, and so pervasive, that they are normally experienced as an identity."[15]

Thus, all the meaning, all the feeling – and this includes all the movement and the bodily tensions and impulses concomitant to emotion – are gathered from the world of the work into a sensuous focus which is the language of the work in its physical side, namely its sound and the bodily movement which produces the sound. In the cohesive fusion of the three strata which gives unity to the speech stream is lodged a good deal of the secret of verbal art. The unified speech stream is simultaneously movement, sound, and meaning. Thus meaning itself – however lofty, abstract, or spiritual – coheres in a sensuous focus; meaning can be heard in the ear and felt in the speaking body. Thus literature is a legitimate

child of Apollo; simultaneously moving, sounding, and meaning, literature finds its full, natural place in the family of arts. Indeed, it "sets out from the sensuous and operates within its limits." And yet, *mirabile dictu*, the sensuousness of language is operationally identified on its semantic or symbolic side with the whole range of human meaning, of human aspiration, of human feeling. And we can adopt Wordsworth's magnificent conception to assert that the object of this art "is truth, not individual and local, but general, and operative . . . carried alive into the heart by passion . . . [16]

In this light, I would suggest that the oral interpreter would do well to strive for the fullest possible empathic response not merely to the fictive world of the work to be read but especially with its language itself as just described. The fictive world – all of it – is there in the physical side of the language. And the delivery of that fictive world is inevitably mediated by the delivery of the language. Similarly, the sound bridge (with its appertaining paralinguistic support systems) is inevitably projected from reader to audience by the kinesthetically and tactilely perceptible action of speaking.

Concretely, my suggestions for achieving empathy with the language would come to these five points:

(1) study the world of the work not as so many free-floating ideas, images, and feelings but as they cohere with the sound and kinesthetic-tactile feel of the language;
(2) avoid reading *through* the words (as if they were not there) to the fictive world but rather read that world *in* the words as physical realities;
(3) attend repetitiously and in detail to the kinesthetic and tactile feel of the language in the lungs, throat, tongue, mouth, and lips;
(4) pay careful attention of the bodily thrust of the syllables, the physical pulse of the rhythm, the articulation of consonants and formation of vowels, etc. – all of this as they bring the meaning and the feeling of the fictive world to birth in the sound of the work;
(5) experiement with the kinesthetic and tactile feel of the language in a few soundless mouthings of the language as well as in much full oral delivery.[17]

I would like to conclude with a few reflections on this method as it might be applied to Shakespeare's Sonnet 65:

Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea,
But sad mortality o'er-sways their power,
How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea,
Whose action is no stronger than a flower?
O, how shall summer's honey breath hold out
Against the wrackful siege of battering days,
When rocks impregnable are not so stout,
Nor gates of steel so strong, but Time decays?
O fearful meditation! where, alack,
Shall Time's best jewel from Time's chest lie hid?
Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back?
Or who spoil of beauty can forbid?
O, none, unless this miracle have might,
That in black ink my love may still shine bright.

Description of the poem (I now really prefer to withhold the word analysis from my students in the beginning; it is a stumbling block and *description* causes fewer distractions) description or meditation or contemplation of the text is mandatory. This sonnet is one of hundreds, probably thousands, of poems in the well-used--not so say hackneyed--tradition claiming the power to "eternize" their subjects. A famous prototype is Horace's "Exegi monumentum aere perennius"--"I have built a monument more lasting than bronze" -- but, it was in Renaissance sonneterring that the theme was superabundantly exploited. The student need only read a typical selection of Shakespeare's sonnets in an anthology to see that this theme is not unique to Sonnet 65.

The direct and obvious intensity of the poem's emotion instructs us to seek for a profound engagement with something of the deepest human concern, or failing to find that, to dismiss the poem as bombast and febrile sentimentality. With regard to emotional intensity, I am thinking of its self-description as a "fearful meditation" and its emotionally taut and rhetorical questions. But when we do contemplate the details of the poem, what we find *is* indeed a rich and fearful meditation circling about a compact, richly detailed consideration of the conflict between man and time. The three quatrains turn this contemplation of the conflict between man and time around concrete scenes which they suggest. A fierce courtroom attack is the scene in the first quatrain. In the second, the scene is a physical siege. The third quatrain, working through an amazing, interlocked set of four quadrival puns, presents a kaleidoscopic sequence of scenes of theft, robbery, rape, and murder.

Rage is the pivotal word in the first quatrain. It looks back to the *sad mortality* or the intrinsic principle of corruption which, working form within, eventually decays the four physical elements marshalled in order of increasing size in the first line. In this function it is a seething cauldron of destructive forces which may appropriately remind the modern reader of nature "ferocious" in the decay of Richard Eberhart's "The Groundhog."[18] The Renaissance reader would perhaps recall the traditional philosophical principle, related to the modern idea of entropy, expressed by Thomas Acquinas in the grim proposition "Things capable of not being at some time are not."[19] But the word *rage* also feeds forward[20] simultaneously to the courtroom implications of *hold a plea* and *action*. Thus *this rage*, already identified in the poem as the intrinsic principle of corruption, becomes a savage, fuming prosecutor pressing a case against *beauty* whose defense is as fragile as a floower's.

In gathering these details from the fictive world and incorporating them in the poem's sensuous focus of contemplation, namely the physical action and sound of the lines, the oral interpreter will both note *and practice* physically feeling the expansiveness swelling up toward the end of the first line: the last element of the series of four, *sea*, is the only one given an epithet; that epithet *boundless* is the only word in the line which is not a monosyllable; and this element is the jumping off place in the series into vastness beyond the concrete grasp of the senses. The interpreter will also feel a sense of the strength of these material things in the contrastive stress on *their* which becomes the chief metrical variation of the first two lines. He will feel the intensity and emotional charge of *rage* and the desperate plight of beauty in *hold a plea* and something of her fragility in *flower*.

In the second quatrain the scene-giving words are *siege* and *battering* which combination conjure up the battering ram attack of time on beauty in the remorseless assault of succeeding days. The oral reader will fee the intensity of time's attack in the words loaded in the semantic stratum with the violence of attack. This physical sensation will be poised against his feeling for the words signifying power to resist. He will also feel this attempt to resist in the metrical variation at *hold out* (a very heavy lamb if not a hovering accent or spondee). The power of attack and resistance will also be felt physically in the heavy accumulation of stopped consonants, especially in the alliterative sequence. (Note that the set *stout. . steeel..*strong is capped by *time*–the *t* alliterating more fully with *st* in the kinesthetic and tactile feel of the articualtion than would an *s*.)

The fulcrum of the poem, to make use of Charlotte Lee's term,[21] is double (as often in Shakespeare's sonnets)–the beginning of the turn coming with the ninth line as in the ordinary Italian sonnet and the turn being completed by the final couplet. But the matter of the third quatrain is mainly a continuation of the "problem," time's assault on beauty. Indeed this assault motif reaches its climax in the wonderfully rich questions of the third quatrain. The crucial words here are the puns on *jewel, chest, spoil,* and (relexively) *Time*. The complexity of the relationships between these words is a marvel of poetic condensation. *Jewel* carries the meanings "gem," "favorite" ("Mary is a perfect jewel as a babysitter"), and "vagina."[22] *Chest* can mean "jewel box," "seaman's trunk," "thorax," and "coffin."[23] *Spoil signifies "booty," "physical decay," "moral corruption." From these interlocking sets* of meanings, Time becomes the protagonist in a set of aggressive scenes as a thief pirate, lecher, and the Gim Reaper. Perhaps a table may be helpful here:

	jewel	*chest*	*spoil*	*Time*
1.	gem	jewel box	booty	thief
2.	gem	seaman's trunk	booty	pirate
3.	vagina	thorax	moral corruption	lecher
4.	favorite	coffin	physical decay	Grim Reaper

The interpreter's opportunities for empathic response to this kaleidoscopic set of scenes of aggression through the physical side of the language are abundant. Even the poem's generalized summary motif, "O fearful meditation," offers a compact physical emblem for itself in the anguished, autistic play at lips (f...f...m) and teeth (d...t...t). The tension of time's attacks can be felt by the interpreter in the slow, powerful, grinding of the adjacent stresses in the lines

where, alack

/ / / / / / /

Shall Time's best jewel from Time's chest lie hid?

/ / / / / /

Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back?

Even in the metrically regular line which completes the three quatrains –

Or who his spoil of beauty can forbid - - -

the meditative accumulation of image, scene, act, and passion massively rests on each of the four strong stresses. *Spoil*, especially, constitutes a summative icon for the fearful energies of meaning and feeling in the quatrains.

The couplet, still maintaining the element of conflict in the antithetical "shine bright in black ink" paradox, asserts that poetic immortality is beauty's only and best refuge. This claim splits the feeling at the conclusion of this meditation into admiration for the power of poetry to enshrine beauty and into the abiding agony for the loss of beauty in physical life which it is also the function of poetry to reflect. Here the interpreter's challenge is to achieve an empathic response to the language that will simultaneously do justice to the verbal wit, the faith in the power of poetry to confer immortality, and to the tragic sense of the ineluctible loss of physical beauty.

[1]Interesting surveys of some of the discussion of empathy can be found in Richard Harter Fogle, *The Imagery of Keats and Shelley* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1949), pp. 139ff. and in Gilda Parrella, "Projection and Adoption: Toward a Clarification of the Concept of Empathy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 57 (1971), 204-213. Parrella's isolation of the idea of adoptive empathy from the usual treatments of empathy as projection is helpful and tends to defuse some of the criticism of empathy made by the aestheticians named in the following note.

[2]See Rudolf Arnheim, *Toward A Psychology of Art* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 53, 316; Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present: A Short History* (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. and Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1966), p. 380; *idem*, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958), p. 110; Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, tr. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 220n., 237; Durt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), pp. 326, 407; *idem*, "Problems in the Psychology of Art" in Richard Bernheimer, Rhys Carpenter, K. Koffka, and Milton C. Nahm, *Art: A Bryn Mawr Symposium* (New York: Oriole Editions, 1972), pp. 180-272 (reprinted from its original publication in 1940 as Volume IX of the Bryn Mawr Notes and Monographs); Carroll C. Pratt, "The Form and Function of Music," in *Aesthetic Inquiry: Essays on Art Criticism and the Philosophy of Art*, ed. Monroe C. Beardsley and Herbert M. Schueller (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 222-223.

[3]Ingarden, p. 203n.

[4]Clarence D. Thorpe, "Empathy," in *Dictionary of World Literature*, ed. Joseph T. Shipley (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943), p. 187 (column 2).

[5]Richard Harter Fogle, "Empathy and Sympathy" in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, enlarged edition, ed. Alex Preminger *et al* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Thorpe (see note 4); M.H. Abrams, "Empathy and Sympathy" in his *A Glossary of Literary Terms*, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).

[6]Wallace A. Bacon, *The Art of Interpretation*, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 10-11, 110-112, 134, *et passim;* Robert Beloof, *The Performing Voice in Literature* (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 111-114; Don Geiger, *The Sound, Sense, and Performance of Literature* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1963), pp. 86-88, 100; Charlotte Lee,

Oral Interpretation, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), pp. 67-70 *et passim*.

[7]Chester Clayton Long, *The Liberal Art of Interpretation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 48-60, 211-222.

[8]Abrams, p. 46.

[9]See, for example, Bacon, pp. 10-11 and Lee, pp. 67-70.

[10]On the kinesthetic-tactile feel of the language of literature, see William Craig Forrest "The Kinesthetic Feel of Literature," *Bucknell Review*, 13 (1968), 91-106; *idem*, "Literature as Aesthetic Object: The Kinesthetic Stratum," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 27 (1969), 455-459.

[11]See Forrest, "The Poem as a Summons to Performance," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 9 (1969), 302ff.

[12]Eduard Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music*, tr. Gustav Cohen, ed. with an introduction by Morris Weitz (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1957), p. 49.

[13]William Butler Yeats, "A Prayer for Old Age," in *The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats*, Definitive Edition (New York: MacMillan,1959), p. 281.

[14]W.K. Wimsatt, "Foreword" to *Versification: Major Language Types*, ed. W.K. Wimsatt (New York: Modem Language Association and New York University Press, 1972), pp. viii-ix.

[15]Wimsatt, p. ix.

[16]William Wordsworth, "Preface" to *Lyrical Ballads in The Prose Works of William Wordsworth*, 3 vols., ed. W.J.B. Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser (Oxford: At the Calrendon Press, 1974), I, 139.

[17]Although he is oriented toward empathic response to elements in the fictive world of the work, Robert M. Post in his "Achievement of Empathic Response in Oral Reading," *Southern*

Speech Communication Journal, 28 (1963), 236-240, suggests that empathic response should be developed in oral rehearsals. Post's article is the only source I have been able to find making any suggestions on how empathy is to be acquired by the oral interpreter; in general the textbooks simply say "Empathize" and expect the student to intuit how this is to be accomplished. Long's sensory tracking is an honorable exception and would work well in combination with the suggestions for achieving empathy with the language as physical action given in the present essay, I believe.

[18]The first twelve lines of "The Groundhog" are apropos: In June, amid the golden fields,/ I saw a groundhog lying dead./ Dead lay he; my senses shook, / And mind outshot our naked frailty./ There lowly in the vigorous summer/ His form began its senseless change,/ And made my senses waver dim/ Seeing nature ferocious in him./ Inspecting close his maggots' might/ And seething cauldron of his being,/ Half with loathing, half with a strange love,/ I poked him with an angry stick." Cited from Richard Eberhart, *Collected Poems 1930-1976* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 23.

[19]*Summa Theologiae*, Part I, Question II, Article 3.

[20]Cf. I.A. Richards' discussion of this term in "Toward a More Synoptic View" in *Speculative Instruments* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 119-122.

[21]Lee, p. 27 *et passim*.

[22]See *jewel* in Eric Partridge, *Shakespeare's Bawdy: A Literary and Psychological Essay and a Comprehensive Glossary*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955.

[23]Although Shakespeare does not elsewhere use *chest* to mean "coffin," the *Oxford English Dictionary* attests the currency of this sense of the word in Shakespeare's time.

Empathy with Unconscious Fantasy in Keats' 'Ode to Melancholy': Literary Possibilities of an Adapted Psychoanalytic Technique

by

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JOHN KEATS

ODE ON MELANCHOLY

I

No, no, go not to Lethe, neither twist
    Wolf's-bane, tight-rooted, for its poisonous wine;
Nor suffer thy pale forehead to be kissed
    By nightshade, ruby grape of Proserpine;
Make not your rosary of yew-berries,
    Nor let the beetle, nor the death-moth be
        Your mournful Psyche, nor the downy owl
A partner in your sorrow's mysteries;
    For shade to shade will come too drowsily,
        And drown the wakeful anguish of the soul.

II

But when the melancholy fit shall fall
    Sudden from heaven like a weeping cloud,
That fosters the droop-headed flowers all,
    And hides the green hill in an April shroud;
Then glut thy sorrow on a morning rose,
    Or on the rainbow of the salt sand-wave,
        Or on the wealth of globed peonies:
Or if thy mistress some rich anger shows,
    Imprison her soft hand, and let her rave,
        And feed deep, deep upon her peerless eyes.

III

She dwells with Beauty—Beauty that must die;
    And Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips
Bidding adieu; and aching Pleasure nigh,
    Turning to poison while the bee-mouth sips.
Aye, in the very temple of Delight
    Veiled Melancholy has her sovran shrine,
        Though seen none save him whose strenuous tongue
    Can burst Joy's grape against his palate fine;
His soul shall taste the sadness of her might,
    And be among her cloudy trophies hung.

Below is the cancelled opening stanza.

Though you should build a bark of dead men's bones,
And rear a phantom gibbet for a mast,
Stitch creeds together for a sail, with groans

To fill it out, blood-stained and aghast;
Although your rudder be a dragon's tail
Long severed, yet still hard with agony,
Your cordage larde uprootings from the skull
Of bald Medusa, certes you would fail
To find the Melancholy—whether she
Dreameth in any isle of Leth dull...

Today, the bulk of the current literature on empathy lies not in aesthetics, phenomenology, or even in psychology taken as a total field, but in the areas of *experimental psychology* using operational definitions of *predictive* empathy,[1] in clinical psychology, in *oral interpretation*, both in our texts and in the scholarly contributions of Gilda Parrella,[2] in discussions of *literary kinesthesia* best known to us in the work of William C. Forrest,[3] and is presently one of the riches of the on-going literature of *psychoanalysis*.[4] Because psychoanalytic concepts of empathy are probably least known in oral interpretation, I decided to make my contribution in this area despite my novice status.*

Insofar as I am able to judge the developing literature in this field, since I am far from having been able to encompass it, it is characterized by subtlety, complexity and divergence. Individual authors differ as to the particular phenomena selected for study within the same general field, and insofar as these authors select the same phonomena there are fine distinctions among them in individual renderings and interpretation. Therefore, I decided to take a single concept of empathy, that of Beres and Arlow,[5] explain it as clearly as possible, and then to adapt the empathic technique they propose for the analyst dealing with a patient to the oral interpreter dealing with a literary *text*—that is, these words in this order. I had already chosen Keats' *Ode on Melancholy*, as it is a prime example of the arousal of the kinesthetic empathy I had originally expected to study. I have loved it ever since my first encounter with it in a course on the English Romantics. I know it very well, and it seemed interesting to find out what empathic

aspects would be discovered by using a different approach. Lines 26 and 27 I have long used as an extraordinary example of kinesthetic empathy:

Though seen of none save him whose strenuous
toungue
Can burst Joy's grape against his palate fine;[6]

Beres and Arlow (p. 33) point out that empathy, for them, has two distinguishing features: "...one, it is a transient identification; second, the observer preserves his separateness from the object." They add (p.34) that "the capacity for empathy consists of more than immediate affective response; it requires considerable ego development;" and note that "the capacity for empathy increases with age, particularly the experience of suffering."

As to the process of empathy in the therapist (p. 35), they note that "the reaction of the empathizing therapist is a complex one, a mixture of affect and cognition." They refer to the affect of the therapist as a "signal affect" –the transient identification leading to an awareness of what the patient may be feeling. Further, they note that the signal affect is followed by an unconscious fantasy to which the affect is appropriate, "shared in common between therapist and patient." What they mean, as I interpret their discussion of their illustrative clinical material, is shared *analogous* fantasies which may be remarkably alike, and in some ways identical.

They also remark (p. 45) on the analogy between aesthetic experience and psychoanalytic experience with that between the poet and his audience, and that poetic *devices* and *devices* which convey affect to the analyst are the same "contiguity, repetition, symbolism and above all, metaphor."[7]

In discussing Bere's earlier work on the relationship between aesthetic and psychoanalytic experienced fantasies are shared with the audience, because they are "based on universally shared early, biologic experiences of mankind." They note that both psychoanalytic and poet-audience interactions are (p. 46) "based upon the communicability of unconscious fantasy," and also that while psychoanalysis seeks to reconstruct the unconscious fantasy in art, "for reasons of defense, the experience remains at the level of derivative expressions of unconsious fantasy."

For the oral interpreter, who must to a considerable degree during his preparation for performance empathize with the speaker of the poem, it would seem desirable that he empathize not only with the conscious fantasy of the poem but also with its unconscious fantasy, based like that of the patient, on "universally

shared biologic experiences of mankind." Since the interpreter does not have directly available the non-verbal behavior, including intonational and paralinguistic communication – i.e., vocal– as well as non-audible but visible behavior of the speaker of the poem, while the patient does provide the analyst with such communication, the interpreter is limited to what he can glean from the text. However, the poetic text usually provides ample "contiguity, repetition, symbolism, and above all, metaphor," –the forms of expression and communication through imagery.

To arrive at conclusions concerning these sources of affect and affective power, ordinarily the interpreter analyses the terms compared, associated, or repeated at a *conscious* level–especially when writing a paper! In silent reading, or in preparing for performance, or performing, interpreters also often must be unconsciously in touch with the unconscious level fantasies underlying their texts. But a technique for assuring that interpreters can have access to the unconscious level more regularly seems desirable, since such access must surely play a role in achieving good performances. What I would like to recomment here is getting in touch with the universal *unconscious* fantasy underlying the conscious fantasy of the text by means of an approximation of the state recommended for anlysts (originally by Freud) of "free-floating attention," or "evenly-hovering attention," and see what results.

Before applying this "hovering attention" to get at unconscious fantasy, I would recommend (1) approach the work for a time with free-floating attention to grasp cognitive and affective contents as aspects of a complex whole; (2) make a preliminary statement of (a) its intellectual, and (b) its affective content; (3) bring it to virtual memorization so that constant resort to the text in a physical form is not necessary. *Then*, let your mind rove freely over the text in as relaxed and open a state as possible. In applying this step to the Keats' poem, I lay down on my bed and let my mind float freely and without direction over the text, which I imagined as a carpet (as I do most lyric texts), letting the words, conceived as elements in the design, suggest what they would to stimulate my urconscious fantasy–the words hopefully to elicit an empathic identification with the unconscious fantasy of the speaker of the poem, and in the case of Keats, with Keats himself. Following this, integration of the results of free-floating attention with all findings and responses, and their development into a more fully developed vision of the whole–as statement, as process, and as feeling–is the goal. Naturally, the process of rehearsal may involve repetition of any step, and the interpreter may also, after all steps have been

followed at least once, wish to consult the psychoanalytic literature, as well as that of literary criticism, of biography, and of descriptions of the literary tradition and the social milieu, etc. Here I shall limit myself to psychoanalytic literature, and psychoanalytically-based discussion.

I shall now give the original results of step (2) in order to provide a background for my use of free-floating attention from which primal fantasies emerged.

I wrote that *intellectually:* "The theme is that melancholy can be acutely and truly felt only in the presence of joy and the perception of beauty and its transience." This, and closely related themes are familiar in poetry. Consider, for example, these lines from Wallace Stevens' "Sunday Morning," (Section V, lines 3-5):

Death is the mother of beauty: hence from her;
Alone shall come fulfillment to our dreams
And our desires...

My perception of the affect of the poem required that I write more than one word–I found "poignant," "bittersweet" [with empasis on the polatiry], "heartache," "body ache," a "strenuousness of feeling," and "a cry." Paradoxically, I also found a sense of enjoyment–especially in stanza two–"bitter*sweet*" is pervasive.

What follows are my personal notes on my free-floating trip over the poem. They were written half discursively, half with notes on the side. I have added here only the verbal additions needed to make coherent sentences, and included one dictionary reference I looked up before recording my impressions. This reference is noted in square brackets, as are a few more recent substantive interpolations–that may be recollections rather than additions.

Perhaps initially connected with that "strenuous tongue" image, I became aware of thirst and hunger, especially thirst, or perhaps an undifferentiated mixture as in a baby's hunger for milk. Look at the words–connecting breast and mouth–"Lethe" (necessary to drink to obtain oblivion), "wine," "glut," "feed deep, deep," "while the bee-mouth sips," the "strenuous tongue" that "Can burst Joy's grape against his palate," and "taste" [and 'thirst' itself]. Connected with these is "Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips bidding adieu." This began to suggest more strongly a sense of mouth and lips longing for the breast, which seemed then to be connected with the round "ruby grape" and "Joy's grape." The former turned out to be the red berries of a certain kind of nightshade, [according to my *Standard College Dictionary*, "the *woody* or *bittersweet nightshade*] (Solanum dulcarmara)," having purple flowers and red berries. This

suggested nipples; "Joy's grape" might also be one. These and the arch of the rainbow and even the eyes, and the "morning rose" and the "globed peonies"–all seem to be breast images. It is also possible that the ruby grapes especially are both metaphors [like] nipples and metonyms [associated with, part of, etc.] for the breast as a whole: cf. note 7. The rose and peonies give a genital sense as well–as indeed the major "strenuous tongue" image has a genital underlay suggesting a French kiss [still *oral* sex] and intercourse as well.[8] The weeping cloud also may be related to the breast [cf. Dylan Thomas, "Now in the cloud's big breast lie quiet countries/Delivered Seas . . .][9] and giving liquid, as may the "green hill" hidden by the "April shroud," which also suggests the mound of Venus and genital desire. That the "weeping cloud" nourished or "fosters" (like a nurse) "the droop-headed flowers" suggests that the desire for the breast is accompanied by genital desire [response].[10]

The next train of associations I began to make concern touch–, the "twist" to be replaced by "burst" and "taste," "forehead to be kissed," "rosary of yew-berries" (counting the beads (nipples) of death with the fingertips), "the downy owl," "the salt sand-wave"–and I connected these with the associations to hands–"twist," "rosary," "Imprison her soft hand," "Joy, whose hand." The hand seems to operate in several ways; it is sensual, even sexual. [I was puzzled by the many references and connections with *hands.*]

Connected with the hunger-thirst imagery, I then began to see how much was *wet*–reminding me a little of Hopkins' line, "Thirst's all-in-all in a world of wet,"[11] (which Hopkins was unable to quench). Wet are "Lethe," "wine," the "grapes," the "weeping cloud," the "April shroud," "rainbow" [a visual effect of moisture], "salt sand-wave," and the wetness of "eyes" that one looks into. (Did Fanny Brawne use belladonna?)

There seemed to be religious connotations–the hand and mouth together suggesting communion, "soul," the pagan "Lethe," and "Proserpine," "mysteries," "temple," "shrine," and the Christian "rosary." [The personification of Melancholy also has a religious aspect.]

[I remained puzzled by "twist," "tight-rooted," "forehead," as well as by "hand."]

I had a sense of a human face–[this was the strangest part of my experience].

I had a sense of the need for communion [or union or fusion] with melancholy, from "Joy's grape," and "taste the sadness of her might," which gives communion and consummation in fantasy.

I noted the amount of kinesthesia in single kinesthetic words, such as "twist," "kissed," "drowsily," "anguish," "aching," as well as in the "strenuous tongue" which "can burst Joy's grape." [I noted that there seemed to be sounds connected in this group of words, including such mouth sounds as (w), such velars as (k), (g) and the (ŋ) of "anguish" and "aching." See Note 8 above for other labials, and note that *kissing* means a bilabial action][12]

"Aching pleasure nigh" suggested to me both 'pleasure for which one aches' or 'pleasure during which one aches.'

I also noted what to me is the ambiguity of "She" in line 21. [I believe the mistress is in the temple with "Veiled Meloncholy, the veil suggesting mourning, and is closely identified with a third '*she*,' "Beauty that must die."][13] All give *both* pleasure and sorrow. [The two remaining figures, "Joy and "aching Pleasure," are perhaps attendant young boys, like cupid.]

[In summary] I took the poem to be at the level of unconscious fantasy–consummation of the infantile wish for oral gratification–in fantasy–with sadness as well as joy because it *is* fantasy. Perhaps because of social and interpersonal restrictions of the time, genital fulfillment was forced into abeyance. [Here a few more details of my fantasy followed.]

"Cloudy trophies" suggested to me that she [Melancholy] has the victory and that it is associated with the breast. ["Cloudy" suggests breasts, as well as having a literal meaning, i.e., 'shadowy.']

There was a feeling of much sound. Sounds and images all seemed designed to express oral yearning and sucking ["bee-mouth"] as well as pleasure. Oral eroticism seems to be an important component of Keats' psychic makeup (and of the oral interpreters' makeup as well, perhaps).

I kept wondering about the role of schwa, [ə], as in "hung" as of the rime repetitions of [əŋ] ("tongue," "among," "hung"), and also the other repetitions of [ŋ] especially in "anguish" and "anger." [I had no empathic sense of strangulation–the only literal possibility might be the sense of the mother's arm under the neck and head–or on the conscious level simply 'hung up,' as on a wall; or is there not a expression "the child hanging on the breast?"]

It had never occurred to me before, but in this experience "hung," etc., seemed to me clearly gestural–a swallowing. [This notion comes partly from muscular empathy, but is is more than that.] When we swallow, we strenuously close the back of the mouth with the back of the tongue against the palate just as in [ŋ] given plenty of emphasis by "anger," "tongue," "anguish," "among," "hung."[14] He [the speaker] tastes and swallows the gift

he has pulled from the "weeping cloud" [and burst with his tongue], leading to a dream-like satiety and completion.

I wondered why the mistress showed a "rich anger."[15]

I thought of possible conflict between breast and genital hungers.

I thought of possible conflict between consciousness [called for by the poem] and unconsciousness [suggested by my associations with the poem's ending]. There seemed to be a contrast with *Ode to a Nightingale* for here consciousness is desired on the surface, and the opening of Nightingale begins in and calls for a degree of unconsciousness.

[I also wondered whether the "temple of delight" was a womb or a vaginal symbol, or both,--one's first thought.]

After I finished by fantasies and questions growing out of them, I consulted the nearest available psychoanalyst, my husband, Dr. John Loesch, and reported them with some misgivings and incredulity. He suggested two sources: Renw Spitz's "The Primal Cavity," and Bertram D. Lewin's book, *The Psychoanalysis of Elation*.[16] I shall rely mainly on these to furnish corrections, corroborations, and additions. I especially recommend the Spitz article for the concreteness of his reconstruction of the baby at the breast, and the Lewin book for its insight into the dynamics of elation [even though he does not seem to allow for elation following a happy event without antecedent or concurrent depression].

In the Spitz article I found what seems to me a remarkable congruence of what he describes *with* my fantasy, together with a filling in of particular details I had not been able to interpret, and at least one major suggestion. According to Spitz, the origin of perception in the baby lies in contact sensations in the primal cavity--the mouth--in what we would call a kinesthetic and tactile way (p. 220). This is associated with the hands because of their use in nursing in contact with the breast; the labyrinth of the ear and the outer skin are also involved (pp. 221-223). He also notes the clutch reflex, "closing of the hand at palm for stimulation," as the most reliable reflex at birth, sucking the second (pp. 219-20). Also associated are the nipple (much larger than to an adult because of the smaller mouth of the baby), and sensations of a dry, sandy, gritty quality of the mouth (part of the Isakower phenomenon)[17] coming from thirst, stressing that the sufferings of thirst are far beyond those of hunger (p. 221). He also notes that in earliest experience, the nipple brings relief from unpleasure [brings pleasure?] as a passive experience (p.220). The simultaneous active

experience he describes as follows (p.221):

> The act of sucking and of deglutition (swallowing) is the infant's first active coordinated muscular action. The organs involved are the tongue, the lips, and the cheeks. Accordingly, these are the first ones to be brought under control... Similarly these will be the first surfaces used in tactile perception and exploration... because in this single organ, the mouth cavity, are assembled the representatives of several of the senses in one and the same area. These senses are the sense of touch, of taste, of temperature, of smell, of pain, but also the deep sensibility involved in the act of deglutition (swallowing).[18]

At about 3 months maturation makes possible association of the infant's perception of the primal cavity with his first visual image, the face of his mother, or, as Spitz says, "a Gestalt configuration within the human face." (p. 216) At this period he says (p. 222):

> Stimulation occurring in one system of the body is responded to in others. Overflow is the rule of the hour. We may again advance a hypotheses: When the infant nurses and has sensations in the oral cavity while staring at the mother's face, he unites the tactile and the visual perceptions, the perceptions of the total situation, into one undifferentiated unity, a situation Gestalt, *in which any one part of the experience comes to stand for the total experience.* [Italics mine][19]

Sptiz's discussion provides a framework within which my poetically-induced fantasy hangs together remarkably well—the thirst, the swallowing, the breast, the nipples, etc. He resolved my puzzlement as to the role of the hand, He made clear also the role of the face which had particularly surprised me and which could not have come from mechanical application of my limited knowledge of Freud. He also notes that the primal cavity is "pleasurable and unpleasurable" at the same time. This may account in part for the *bittersweet* affect of the poem. Thirst, explained as the gritty sensation in the baby, may even explain the sand-wave as part of the Isakower phenomenon. With so much corroboration that the underlying fantasy in the poem is oral (at about the third month level and earlier), it is perhaps not too much of an extrapolation from Spitz to consider that Keats' temple of Delight, where "Veiled Melancholy has her sovran shrine" is the *primal cavity* ambiguously his own, or that of his mother—in Jungian terms, the archetypal source of pleasure and pain, source of life and death, the Great Mother, as well.[20]

It remains to summarize Lewin's 'oral triad' which he relates to experiences of elation. Elation to Lewin is an illusory, reality-denying affect growing our of the reliving of three wishes [and their gratification] that begin in the nursing situation: (1) the wish to eat [better–*drink*]; (2) the wish to be eaten [better–drunk?]; and (3) the wish to go to sleep, as after a happy, fulfilling nursing experience. The denial is ultimately a denial of death, though in the case of the neuroses, their analysis shows that the fears are what Freud originally indicated, disguised fears of castration and of the wishes to die that signify female wishes [in either sex] (p. 158). Elation may follow depression stemming from object loss.[21]

In Keats' poem, we see clearly the with to eat (or rather drink), and (I believe) the wish to sleep in reunion with the mother in the postlude nursing situation at the end of the poem. The wish to be eaten (or drunk) is less clear–although since this is considered analogous to the nursing situation of relaxation in the baby, upon have drunk its fill and experiencing the sensation of falling asleep–this may be considered part of the termination of the poem–or its postlude.[22] The poem may be seen as beginning with rhetorical rejection, or overcoming of depression, followed by the wakeful pleasures of nursing in a somehow pleasant malancholia like the beginnings of rain upon parched earth. Notice how greedy the oral drive to eat [drink] becomes in *glut*. The pleasure increases and deepens toward the end of the second stanza. In the third, pleasure and pain combine as they are increased by the presence of each other, and consciousness increases and deepens until it is invaded (l. 27) and finally extinguished by the union-communion with the mother in the last lines (29 and 30) and in the aftermath of the poem.[23]

Upon looking through Keats' poetry, and also at psychological and psychoanalytic discussions of his poetry (very uneven in quality), I can only come to the conclusion that his prime focus is, as in this poem, oral. I have not time to expand on these experiences here, but I should recommend reading Keats' poetry, his biographies by Bate and Ward,[24] and the best article I have so far encountered, J. W. Hamilton's "Object Loss, Dreaming and Creativity."[25] Keat's loss of his mother, by separation when he was five, and by death when he was fourteen, after a period of reunion in reality, explains much about the underlying fantasies of his poetry, though not the miracle of their extraordinary objectification in shuch a great ode as *Ode on Melancholy*.

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1. The following brief bibliography was kindly suggested to me as a starting point for exploring current work on empathy in empirical psychology by Professor Rosalind D. Cartwright, of the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle:

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Bronfenbrenner, U., Harding, J., and Gallwey, M. "The Measurement of Skill in Social Perception," in B. C. McClelland, A. C. Baldwin, U. B Brofenbrenner and F. Strodbock (Ed.), *Talent and Society*. Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1958.

Cline, V. "Interpersonal Perception," in *Progress in Experimental Personality Research*, ed. B. Maher. New York: Academic Press, 1964.

Dymond, R. "A Scale for the Measurement of Empathic Ability," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 13 (1949), 127-133.

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Goodman, N. and Ofshe, R. "Empathy Communication Efficiency and Marital Status," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 30 (1968), 699-603.

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Hogan, R., "Development of an Empathy Scale," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 33 (1972), 307-316.

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Mehrabian, A. and Epstein, N. "A Measure of Emotional Empathy," *Journal of Personality*, 40 (1972), 525-543.

Stotland, E., "Exploratory Investigations of Empathy," in ' L. Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. L. Berkowitz. New York: Academic Press, 1969.

2. Gilda C. Parella, "The Concept of Empathy: A Study in Discovery, Definition and Design with Application to Literature and Its Performance," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1969; "Projection and Adoption: Toward a Clarification in the Concept of Empathy, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 57 (1971): "Image and Mirror: Empathy in Language Devices," *Western Speech*, 36 (1972), 251-260. Many texts include empathy as a concept; see for example, Charlotte I. Lee and Frank Glate, *Oral Interpretation*, Fifth ed. (Boston: Houghton-Migglin, 1977) pp. 72-75 and p. 86; or Wallace A. Bacon, *The Art of Interpretation*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972) pp. 10-11, 110-112, 134. and 138.

3. See William C. Forrest, "Literary Kinesthesis: The Artistic Import of Sensuous Perception Concerned with the Articularoty Stratum of Literature in the Light of Recent Critical Theory and Poetic Practice," Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1960; "The Kinesthetic Feel of Literature," *Bucknell Review*, 16 (December, 1968), 91-106; and "The Kinesthetic Stratum," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 27 (Summer, 1969), 455-59.

4. Because there is currently a plethora of psychoanalytic literature on empathy, I would suggest that the seriously interested reader write for Xeroxes of the concept *Empathy* from *Chicago Psychoanalytic Index*, ed. Glenn E. Miller, The Institute for Psychoanalysis, [180 North Michigan Avenue, 60601]; Chicago, 1960. The index goes back to 1920, but earlier bibliography relevant to current concerns should be picked during the later period. Authors considered psychoanalytically are also listed. Worthy of separate mention are two works by Heinz Kohut: (1) *The Restoration of the Self*. New York: International Universities Press, 1977, and (2) [forthcoming] *Scientific Empathy and Empathic Science: Selected Essays*, ed. P. Ornstein. New York; International Universities Press.

5. David Beres and Jacob A. Arlow [hereafter cited as Beres-Arlow], "Fantasy and Identification in Empathy," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 43 (1974), 26-49. Page citations hereafter are given in the text.

6. The text in Plate I and all citations are from *The Poems of John Keats*, ed. Miriam Allott, London: Longman, 1970. Facsimiles, for comparative purposes, of all Keats' Odes are to be found in Robert Gittings' *The Odes of Keats and Their Earliest Known Manuscripts*, London: Heineman, 1956. Further textual information [but not texts] may be found in Jack Stillinger *The Texts of Keats's Poems*: Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.

7. The list of terms used here suggests that Beres-Arlow have added the metonym (contiguity)-metaphor dichotomy to their conceptualization of affect-carrying devices. Roman Jakobson discusses these in Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle *Fundamentals of Language*, The Haque: Mouton, 1956, pp. 58-62 and pp. 76-82, noting, p. 81, the value of using this dichotomy in investigating the structure of dreams and the relation of the terms to Freud's terminology. See also Jakobson's discussion of poetic function in his "Closing Statement: Linguistics and poetics," in *Style in Language*, ed. Thomas A. Sebcok. New York: Wiley, 1960, pp. 358-375, and his "The Cardinal Dichotomy in Language," in *Language: An Enquiry into its Meaning and Function*, ed. R.N. Ashen New York: Harper, 1957, 155-73. The French analyst, Jaques Lacan, also relates Jakobsonian terminology to Freud in the *Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis*, trans. Anthony Wilden, Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1958, passim—The translator's introduction, preface, and essay (concluding the volume) "Lacan and the

Discourse of the Others," pp. 157-311, are also useful: also Chapters I and II, of Wilden's *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange*, London, 1972, for discussions of the relations between the terminologies of Freud, Jakobson, and Lacan. Applications to the study of literature are becoming more common; e.g., for an application of these terms as tools see Lee Gibbs Queener, "Contiguity Figures: An Index to the Language-World Relationships in Auden's Poetry," *Studies in Interpretation*, ed. Esther M. Doyle and Virginia R. Gloyd, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1972, pp. 67-98.

8. The oral breast fantasy can hardly be over estimated, however. Speaking of Keats in "Ode on Melancholy," Walter Jackson Bate in "The Stylistic Development of Keats," p. 135, says, with no psychoanalytic intent: "Characteristic is the interplay of bilabials in the Ode on Melancholy with its "glo*b*ed *p*eonies," "can *b*urst Joy's gra*p*e against his *p*alate fine," its "aching *p*leasure nigh," "Turning to *p*oison while the *bee-m*outh sips," and its entire first stanza. [The labiality would be increased by including *f* and *w*.] On page 139, Bate remarks that Keats "goes farther and calls the peonies 'globed,' and his hand is almost cupping the peony, compressing it further to fit its 'globed' roundness."

9. From "I make this in a warring absence," *The Collected Poems of Dylan Thomas*, rev. ed., New York: New Directions, 1957, p. 89.

10. See Daniel A. Dervin, "Breast Fantasy and Feeding in Barthelme, Swift and Philip Roth," *American Imago*, 33 (Spring 1976), 102-120, for a stimulating, if not in every respect convincing, discussion of the interplay between breast and primal scene fantasies.

11. From "My own heart let me have more pity on," *Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, 3rd ed., ed. W.H. Gardiner, New York: Oxford, 1948. pp. 110-11.

12. See footnote 8 above on labials in the poem.

13. It is difficult to say whether there are two, or three, but the pat explanations the "She" (1.21) is unequivocally *Melancholy* seems to me misleading. The segmentation of female figures into three, or even four, is interestingly discussed in Ada Farber, "Segmentation of the mother: Women in Greek myth," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 62 (Spring, 1975), 29-47.

14. Cf. note 18, for a scietific description. It seems to me kinesthetically that there is pressure against the pharyngial wall before swallowing is completed. It is a testimony to Keats' preoccupation with [ ] [ ] and the word *anguish*, that the earliest existing manuscript line 29 had *anguish* repeated as in line 10, later to be replaced by the *sadness*, presumably but not certainly be Keats himself. See Gittings, op. cit.

15. Allott, op. cit., in her notes to *Ode on Melancholy* correctly explains this as enjoyment of the intensity of the anger rather than any reaction to hostility.

16. Rene Spitz, "The Primal Cavity: A Contribution to the Genesis of Perception and Its Role for Psychoanalytic Theory," *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, X*, New York: International Universities Press, 1955, pp. 215-240; Bertram D. Lewin, *The Psychoanalysis of Elation*, Psychoanalytic Quarterly: New York, 1950. Hereafter page citations of these sources are included in the text.

17. The Isakower phenomenon is essentially an experience of falling asleep with a constellation of phenomena that seem to involve a regression to earlier states comparable to those of infancy. See Otto Isakower, "A Contribution of the Patho-psychology of Phenomena Associated with Falling Asleep," *International Journal of Psychiatry*, 19 (1938), 331-345.

18. Compare E. Lloyd DuBrul's description of sucking in his *Evolution of the Speech Apparatus*, Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1958, p. 85: "In the sucking sequence, seen either in infantile feeding or adult drinking, the first contact and action are made with the lips. They purse and pull with a kissing sound. As fluid flows intra-orally, it contacts next the tongue-tip, which pulls it back by sharp withdrawal from the palate. As the liquid waves back over the undulating dorsum of the tongue, it is accelerated by stong withdrawal of the thick tongue base from the velum [this can be easily felt]. This shoots the fluid suddenly past the cringing larynx into a gaping esophagus."

19. Observe the metonymic (see footnote 18 above) aspect of the latter part of his statement. It might be observed here that Spitz seems to have made his hypotheses concerning (1) the beginning of the perception as contact perception of the nipple-breast in the oral

cavity and (2) the Gastalt visual-tactile nature of observing that nursing babies do not *look* at the breast, but rather at the mother's face, and knowing that the facts of maturation do not allow for distance perception at birth.

20. See Erich Newmann, *The Great Mother: An Analysis of an Archetype*: Bollingen Series XLVII, trans. Ralph Mannheim, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

21. Lewin's book is too rich in commentary relevant to Keats' poem (and the corpus of Keats' work as well) to be adequately treated here owing to limitations of space. Chapters 1-4 (pp.9-81) treat elation as a phenomena of denial growing out of an antecedent depression but, like it, a continuaation of defense through a change of means, both defenses having an oral erotic base. This antecedent depression may explain the initial later deleted stanzt of "Ode on Melancholy" at the bottom of of Plate I. Chapter IV relates the phenomena of elation to those of sleep (also important in Keats' corpus). Chapter V, to the end (pp. 82-182) deals primarily with the oral triad's three aspects of oral eroticism, including a detailed review of the relevant literature, having built the background for these in earlier chapters. For interpreters his allusion (pp. 132-133) to the term "muscle eroticism," discussed by Gero and first used by Sadger in 1911 (according to Lewin) might be an interesting lead.

22. The entrance of the speaker of the poem into the Melancholy-Delight temple may be seen as an equivalent of "being eaten." Lewin's discussion of ecstasy as a state in which the latter two wishes of the oral triad predominateis pertinent (pp. 144-145):

> The breast is often condensed psychologically with a superego, a deathless one with which the ego identifies itself, so that it can participate in its immortality. Along with the active devouring fantasies goes the sense of yielding to the deathless figure, relaxing in it, and ultimately joining it in a sleep or sleeplike state.

He adds (p. 149) that the ecstatic mood "repeats or relives the non-verbal or never verbalized experience of union at the breast." The earlier wish for sharpened consciousness in the poem may be likened to the manic attitude which (p. 138) "denies any inclination to be devoured, to sleep or to die," while noting that the two states [ecstasy and mania or hypomania] "probably never occur singly, (p.138). He sums it up clearly, (p. 171):

> The [sic] elation, I have argued, would repeat the oral triad of wishes in symbolic form, the ecstatic portion the later blissful stage of nursing, and the mania proper, the postponement of falling asleep and the defensive denials of early dreams. [one may recall again the deleted first stanza].

It may also be relevant that an equivalence between "good" and "bad" sleep and death is discussed by Lewin (pp. 150-153), in which, of two kinds of views concerning death, one potentially may lead to a 'good suicide' based on the expectation of a good [oral fusion] dream state rather that extinction. If Keats had "death wishes," they may have been of this kind. Cf. "ode to a Nightingale" (lines 55-58):

> Now more than ever seems it rich to die,
> To cease upon the midnight with no pain,
> While though art pouring forth thy soul abroad
> In such an ecstasy!

23. It seems to me that following the natural motionless frame of silence concluding the performance of any traditional poem, a swallowing movement might naturlaly succeed the final oral–kinesthetic [ ] of "hung," and be, a swallowing often is, an emotional expression as well.

24. See Walter Jackson Bate, *John Keats*, Cambridge: Harvard Unicersity Press, 1963, and Aileen Ward, *John Keats: The Making of a Poet*, New York: Viking, 1967.

25. James W. Hamilton, "Object Loss, Dreaming and Creativity," *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 24 (1969), pp. 488-531.